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I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamentals of America's procedural due process jurisprudence are
well-known.' Those fundamentals involve the language of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments,2 the requirement that a deprivation of due process
rights must be the result of state action, and the requirement that this
governmental action must adversely impact a protected liberty or property
interest.' The names of procedural due process cases also are familiar
including old warhorses from the right/privilege era like Bailey v. Richardson5
and McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,6 and classics from the period of the
due process explosion like the iconic Goldberg v. Kelly,7 Board of Regents v.
Roth,8 Perry v. Sindermann,9 Paul v. Davis,'0 Mathews v. Eldridge," Goss v.
Lopez,12 Ingraham v. Wright,'3 and Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill. " The decisions discuss issues of whether due process is required
' They are well-known even though due process issues rarely come up in the day-to-day
world of administrative practice at the federal, state, and local levels. WILLIAM F. Fox, JR.,
UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 109 (5th ed. 2008). The issues rarely come up because
most administrative agencies provide more safeguards than the constitutional minimum. Id.
2 The Fifth Amendment states, "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment states, "[N]or
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
' Both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments list deprivations of"life, liberty, or property,"
but the use of the term "life" is generally limited to matters of capital punishment. Fox, supra
note 1, at 110; infra note 6.
4 Administrative law casebooks in the United States typically devote a substantial amount
of coverage to procedural due process. See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF &
CYNTHIA R. FARINA, GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS 767-901 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., rev. 10th ed. 2003). There are many interesting
due process decisions so a major challenge for any casebook author is deciding which cases to
include, which ones to relegate to note status, and which ones to leave out completely.
' 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
6 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
7 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
' 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
9 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
'0 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
' 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
12 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
" 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
14 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
at all, and if it has been triggered, what kind of process is due and when
procedural safeguards must be afforded.15
When due process applies, the Supreme Court has stated that the courts
must weigh three factors in determining whether the procedural safeguards are
adequate: the private interest affected by the agency action; the risk of error
inherent in the agency's existing procedures and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedures; and the government's interest in
maintaining the existing procedures, in terms of both the fiscal and
administrative burdens that might be encountered, if new procedures are
mandated. 6 The many cases applying these factors show that the safeguards
required by due process range from notice and some relatively informal
opportunity to comment or respond, 7 to notice and a full-fledged oral,
adversarial hearing with direct and cross-examination and the other safeguards
associated with civil trials in our state and federal courts.'8
Many of the due process safeguards protecting persons who appear before
administrative agencies in the United States are also recognized in the
European Union (EU), as protecting persons, associations, and companies
involved in proceedings before the European Commission (Commission) and
EU agencies such as the European Environmental Agency and the European
Aviation Safety Agency.'9 Although the treaties governing the EU do not have
provisions like the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,2 ° rights equivalent to
15 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROCESS 231-33 (4th ed. 2004).
16 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
17 See, e.g., Goss, 419 U.S. at 565.
18 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
19 The American Bar Association's in-depth report on administrative law in the EU looks
at the European Commission as well as agencies empowered by the Council of the EU (Council)
or the Commission, including the Office of Harmonization in the Internal Market, the European
Agency for the Evaluation of Medical Products, and the European Food Safety Authority, to
make individualized decisions. This report also looks at adjudicatory proceedings in the
competition, state aids, and trade remedies sectors. See Michael Asimow & Lisl Dunlop,
Adjudication, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 3-6, 9 (George A. Bermann
et al. eds., 2008). "The European Commission, which represents the common interest of the EU,
is the main executive body of the EU. It has the right to propose legislation and ensures that EU
policies are properly implemented." Europa, Europe in 12 Lessons: How Does the EU Work?,
http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_4 (last visited Sept. 20, 2008). Many agencies have been
established by the Commission and the Council other than those listed above. See generally
PAULCRAIG, EUADMINISTRATIVE LAW 148-52 (Grdinne de Bfirca et al. eds., 2006) (discussing
the development of the agency model in the European Union).
20 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000 recognizes several rights associated with due
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notice and opportunity to be heard have evolved in the EU, and as in the
United States, the range and kinds of process rights required in particular
settings vary considerably.2 ' These rights derive from both common law and
civil law doctrines including natural justice and the duty to act fairly in the
United Kingdom,22 constitutional law requirements for proper administrative
procedure in Germany,23 constitutional justice in Ireland, the rights of defense
in France,24 equality of arms, and principles of good administration recognized
in other European nations.2 ' They developed in large part through the
decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First
Instance (CFI). These safeguards will be referred to collectively as either the
"right to be heard" or the "rights of defense." 26
This Article discusses the procedural safeguards that have been recognized
in the EU and the parallels between procedural due process in the United
States and the rights of defense in the EU. It compares these respective rights
and safeguards and explains how U.S. and EU procedures for agency
adjudications are converging.27 Part II sets out the fundamental principles of
process, and it would have been given binding legal force under the Constitutional Treaty
of 2004 that was not approved by several countries. It appears to be dead. See generally Jerry
L. Mashaw, ReasonedAdministration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project
of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 99, 99-100 (2007). See also infra
notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
2 See CRAIG, supra note 19, at 349-50. This Article will not discuss the participation rights
afforded by Community legislation in regard to establishing standards equivalent to agency
regulations. There are EU parallels to notice and comment rulemaking in the United States with
requirements about making information available to interested persons, consulting with
interested persons under certain circumstances, and allowing for comment on proposed norms.
Id. at 322-30.
22 JORGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1180 (1992). The English
approach, emphasizing fair procedures and court-like processes in administrative hearings has
been influential, especially after Britain joined the Community in 1973. Francesca Bignami,
Three Generations of Participation Rights Before the European Commission, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 62, 64 (2004).
23 SCHWARZE, supra note 22, at 1176-77 (discussing the Miilheim-K~rlich decision,
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 20, 1979, 53
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 30 (65) (F.R.G.)).
24 Id. at 1182, 1197.
25 Mashaw, supra note 20, at 99-100.
26 Jirgen Schwarze's book discusses the rights of defense while Paul Craig discusses the
right to be heard. Compare, e.g., ScHwARzE, supra note 22, at 1324, with CRAIG, supra note 19,
at 361. Craig also discusses "process" rights, covering most of the rights we associate with due
process in the United States. See CRAIG, supra note 19, at 349. See also Asimow & Dunlop,
supra note 19, at 36-37, 37 n.78.
27 See Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 36-37.
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American due process and EU right to be heard jurisprudence. Part Ill
provides a detailed analysis of the rights of defense in the EU and highlights
how this bundle of rights parallels the rights to notice and opportunity to be
heard in the United States. Part IV discusses four of the significant
components of the rights of defense: adequate notice, the opportunity to make
one's views known to the administration, the right of access to documents in
the administration's files, and the requirement of reasoned decisions. The
Article concludes that notwithstanding the infrequent utilization of adversarial
hearings in EU administrative adjudications, the procedural safeguards
provided in adjudicative proceedings before the Commission and EU agencies
satisfy the U.S. conception of procedural due process. These procedures are
essential for protecting and maintaining the rule of law in the EU, as well as
in the United States.28
II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
A. Due Process Fundamentals
The basic principles of America's procedural due process jurisprudence
have been announced and applied many times by the Supreme Court. The
requirements apply only to deprivations of liberty and property interests
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Liberty and property are
"broad and majestic terms," but there are boundaries.29 For instance, a
person's liberty interests include his or her good name, reputation, honor, and
integrity,30 but a person is not deprived of a liberty interest when he or she is
simply not retained or rehired to a particular job.3 Similarly, to have a
property interest in something such as an occupational license or disability
benefits, a person must have more than an abstract desire or need for that
interest, or more than a unilateral expectation of it. Instead, there must be a
legitimate claim of entitlement to the property interest.32
28 Jill Wakefield, The Right to Good Administration, in 58 EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS 21
(2007) (stating that the rule of law necessarily includes fair and impartial administrative
procedures).
29 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972). The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments refer to deprivations of"life, liberty, [and] property." Discussion of due process
protections in the context of criminal prosecutions is beyond the scope of this Article.
" Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
3' Roth, 408 U.S. at 575.
32 Id. at 577. In contrast, the Supreme Court has made clear that there is no requirement for
hearings when an agency promulgates rules or regulations of general public applicability as
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The Supreme Court has held that some form of hearing is required before
an individual is deprived of a protected liberty or property interest.33 The
essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.34 The extent to which due process requires a full
evidentiary hearing in the context of agency adjudications prior to the
deprivation of a protected interest varies considerably from context to context.
"Due process... is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances";35 instead, it "is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands. 36
In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, has the Court held that a "hearing
closely approximating a judicial trial is necessary."37 The elements identified
by Justice Brennan in Goldberg were notice, an oral hearing before an
impartial decision maker with direct and cross-examination, opportunity to
obtain counsel, and a decision that is based exclusively on the basis of the
record compiled at the hearing and is accompanied by a statement of reasons.3"
However, Goldberg represents the high-water mark in America's due process
explosion. 39 Due process is often satisfied by procedures much less formal
than what Justice Brennan set forth.4" Identification of the specific dictates of
due process in a particular situation requires consideration of three factors: the
private interest affected by the official action; the risk of erroneous deprivation
of that interest with the existing procedures and the value, if any, of additional
safeguards; and the government's interest, including the function involved and
opposed to deciding a particularized case that directly impacts an individual. Compare
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
33 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).
34 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
31 Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
(quoting McGrath, 341 U.S. at 162-63).
36 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
31 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
38 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970). The late Judge Henry Friendly listed eleven essential
components to a "fair" administrative proceeding, adding to Goldberg's listing the right to know
the evidence against you, judicial review, and notice of the proposed agency action. Henry J.
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279-96 (1975).
3' Fox, supra note 1, at 113, 115.
40 Goldberg is "an extreme case" and most post-Goldberg U.S. Supreme Court decisions
have approved far fewer procedural elements. Id. at 249.
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the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail.4
The provisions of the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA)42 for
formal adjudication provide more procedural safeguards than required by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Most agency adjudications are,
however, classified as "informal," and the APA is almost silent on mandating
procedures for informal adjudication." Still, most informal agency action that
offers minimal procedural safeguards passes constitutional muster 5 and the rock-
bottom minimum is notice and some opportunity for comment.' That rock-
bottom minimum is, however, too spare in many contexts.47 Instead, it is
appropriate to say that due process might be satisfied if a decision making
procedure has the four ingredients which one leading scholar defined as being
essential to an acceptable system of adjudication.48 These ingredients are: (1)
parties must be apprised of the agency's position, i.e., parties must receive notice
and have an opportunity to comment on the evidence against them; (2) agencies
must be as open as possible in reaching their decisions; (3) any action must be
accompanied by a statement of findings and reasons; and (4) agencies must try
to remain consistent through the application of precedent to the decisions.4
B. EU Right to Be Heard Fundamentals
One might say that recognition of the right to be heard in the EU is
surprising given the general differences between the common law and civil law
approaches to administrative adjudication.50 In common law systems,
41 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
42 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-504, 551-596 (2006). This statute "sets
forth the basic procedural rules governing the work of administrative agencies. The APA
represents to administrative law practice what the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represent to
federal civil litigation practice: the basic blueprint that sets the background rules that generically
govern agency proceedings." ROGERS, HEALY & KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 14, at 109.
41 ROGERS, HEALY & KROTOSZYNSKY, supra note 14, at 27, 111-13 (discussing 5 U.S.C.
§§ 554, 556-557).
44 Id. at 112.
45 Fox, supra note 1, at 248-49.
" Id. at 132.
41 Id. at 250.
48 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES, TEXT & PROBLEMS 514 (6th
ed. 1977).
49 Id.
o Cf Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 32-37; CRAIG, supra note 19, at 363.
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adjudications are often quasi-judicial and adversarial.5 For instance, under the
APA in the United States, the investigation and adjudicative stages of a
proceeding are separate, with hearings conducted before an impartial
administrative law judge who did not have a role in the investigation.5 2 There
is generally a separation of functions so that the persons who investigate and
prosecute are not permitted to be decision makers.53 This separation is also
seen in the United Kingdom where administrative determinations can be
challenged at a hearing conducted by a tribunal whose members have not been
involved with the case. 4
In contrast, the civil law approach is often described as inquisitorial
(investigative might be a more apt description)." Hearings are considered part
of the agency's investigation. The decision maker controls the proceeding
from start to finish, conducting an active and independent inquiry into the
merits of the case, including the examination of witnesses.56 There might be
little formal procedure before the agency;57 if there is a hearing it will be for
fact finding;58 and the company or individual that is the target of the
investigation must wait for the completion of the agency's process and then
apply to a specialized court for review.59
For example, a typical case in the competition sector with the European
Commission starts with an investigation by staff in response to a complaint
about a possible violation of EU law or in response to an application for a
benefit or an exemption. This is followed by notice to the target company or
the applicant with the agency's tentative findings. During the course of the
investigation, there might be a hearing conducted by the same persons who are
handling the investigation.60 This hearing will give the target or applicants an
"I Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 32-33.
52 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 556(b) (2006).
51 Id. But see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (authority of state medical examining
board to investigate physicians, present charges, rule on those charges, and impose punishment
does not violate due process).
14 SCHWARZE, supra note 22, at 1180.
55 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 34 n.72 (explaining that the term "inquisitorial" has
"unfortunate connotations" and suggesting it may be more accurate to use the terms "inquiry"
or "investigational").
56 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN E. SEXTON & HELEN HERSHKOFF, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 2-3 (9th ed. 2005).
57 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 362.
58 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 3, 35.
59 Bignami, supra note 22, at 64.
6 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 35. See id. at 3.
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opportunity to present their side of the matter, but it is not an adversarial
proceeding. In some sectors, however, independent officers conduct the
hearings instead of the persons who are doing the investigation. The ultimate
decision makers do not attend these hearings.61
Notwithstanding the differences between common law and civil
administrative adjudications, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe adopted a resolution in 1977 concerning the protection of individuals
in relation to acts of administrative authorities. The resolution's preamble
acknowledges the significant differences between the legal systems of the
Community's member states and then provides that "there is a broad consensus
concerning the fundamental principles which should guide the administrative
procedures and particularly the necessity to ensure fairness in the relations
between the individual and administrative authorities."62 These principles
include "the right to a hearing before the administration; the right of access to
essential facts; the right to legal advice; the duty of the administration to give
reasons for its decisions; [and] the duty of the administration to indicate the
possibilities for legal challenge to its decision."63
The EU's founding treaties, however, have little to say about administrative
procedure, and some of the safeguards now associated with the rights of
defense were provided in regulations (the equivalent of statutes)' 4 enacted by
the Community for specific areas.65 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, as proclaimed by the Nice European Council in
December 2000,66 provides for a right to good administration with safeguards
that are similar to those included in the rights of defense or the right to be
61 Id. at 35.
62 Resolution No. (77)31 of the Comm. of Ministers on the Protection of the Individual in
Relation to the Acts of Administrative Authorities, 275th Meeting of the Ministers' Deputies
(1977), as reprinted in SCHWARZE, supra note 22, at 1185.
63 Recommendation No. R(80)2 of the Comm. of Ministers Concerning the Exercise of
Discretionary Powers by Administrative Authorities, 316th Meeting of the Ministers' Deputies
(1980), as reprinted in SCHWARZE, supra note 22, at 1186.
6 See Rob Widdershoven, European Administrative Law, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, ITS MEMBER STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 259, 270 (Ren6 Seerden &
Frits Stroink eds., 2002).
65 See SCHWARZE, supra note 22, at 1186-88.
1 The Charter, adopted by the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council, and the
Commission "constitutes a political undertaking that has no binding legal effect." Europa,
Charter of Fundamental Rights, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/133501.htm (last visited
Sept. 26, 2008). See also WAKEFIELD, supra note 28, at 1.
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heard.67 The Charter would have become part of the EU Constitution,68 and it
is substantially more detailed than the U.S. Constitution's due process clauses:
Article 1-101 Right to good administration
1. Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled
impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union.
2. This right includes:
(a) the right of every person to be heard, before any
individual measure which would affect him or her
adversely is taken;
(b) the right of every person to have access to his or her file,
while respecting the legitimate interests of
confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy;
(c) the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its
decisions.69
The Charter was intended to declare existing EU law and not to create new
obligations.70 Accordingly, had the EU Constitution been enacted, this "right
to good administration" would have given constitutional status to several of the
components of the rights of defense and fair procedure that evolved in the EU
from decisions of the ECJ and the CFI.7" These courts, like the United States
67 Mashaw, supra note 20, at 99-100. See Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 5 n.3;
CRAIG, supra note 19, at 280; Widdershoven, supra note 64, at 279.
6 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 4 n.1 and accompanying text, 5 n.3 and
accompanying text. See CRAIG, supra note 19, at 279-81; Mashaw, supra note 20, at 100. The
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, commonly called the European Constitution, was
signed in Rome in 2004 by twenty-five representatives of EU's member states. It had to be
ratified by all member states by November 1, 2006. Eighteen states ratified before the European
Constitution was rejected by France and the Netherlands in 2005. The remaining seven states
postponed voting on ratification, so the Constitution was not approved. A reform treaty was
approved at the informal European Council in Lisbon on October 18 and 19, 2007, and was
signed on December 13, 2007. See Europa, A Constitution for Europe, http://europa.en/scad
plus/constitution/introduction en.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008); Europa, Institutional Reform
of the European Union, http://europa.eu/institutionalreform/index-en.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2008).
69 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, art. 11-101, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1, 50
[hereinafter European Constitution]; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
art. 41, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 18 [hereinafter Charter].
70 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 385.
7' Bignami, supra note 22, at 67. See CRAIG, supra note 19, at 361 (explaining that the
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Supreme Court, have taken an active role in determining whether a litigant's
rights of defense have been infringed in any respect, and in ensuring that the
essential elements of fair procedure are observed.72 The ECJ has said that the
"silence of [regulations and other texts] in a matter that affects the protection
of the rights of individuals" must not be construed in a manner unfavorable to
those rights. The right to be heard cannot be restricted or excluded by
legislative acts.73
Notwithstanding the fact that the member states of the EU have not adopted
the European Constitution,74 the right to be heard is now a general rule of
Community law and a part of fundamental rights jurisprudence.75 It is
complemented by case law from the ECJ and CFI that imposes on agencies a
duty to examine carefully the relevant factual and legal aspects of individual
cases. 76 In essence, there is an obligation to exercise care in deciding cases.
Moreover, although the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not binding, the ECJ
and CFI can look to it as an interpretative guide and as declaratory of the case
law that has developed the several components of the right of good
administration.77
I. THE EU's RIGHT TO BE HEARD JURISPRUDENCE
A. Overview
The procedural rights developed through the ECJ's case law are similar to
rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard under America's due process
jurisprudence.7" The several components of the rights of defense command
Charter contains the right to be heard).
72 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 361; SCHWARZE, supra note 22, at 1192 (quoting Case 46/72,
deGreefv. Comm'n, 1973 E.C.R. 543, 558).
13 Joined Cases 8-11/66 SA Cimenteries C.B.R. v. Comm'n, 1967 E.C.R. 75, 92. CRAIG,
supra note 19, at 315 (citing Case T-260/94, Air Inter SA v. Comm'n, 1997 E.C.R. 11-997). Cf.
Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 36 ("[T]here has been a steady accretion of procedural
protections for private litigants and Member States who are engaged in adjudicatory disputes
with the European Commission.").
14 See supra notes 66, 68 and accompanying text.
75 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 314, 361. Professor Craig writes that the content of hearing
rights in the EU have been determined by "a mixture of ad hoc case law, combined with sector-
specific legislation that applies the courts' precepts and fleshes them out." Id. at 362.
76 HANS PETER NEHL, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATwE PROCEDURE IN EC LAW 107 (1999).
71 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 386.
78 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 36.
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that persons receive adequate notice of the Commission's position, including
the essential facts on which the Commission's objections are based;79 they
must be given adequate time to prepare; and they are entitled to inspect
documents in the Commission's file in order to make arguments and lodge
objections subject to requirements of confidentiality and secrecy. 0 In
addition, the ECJ and CFI's decisions recognize protection against self-
incrimination, the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications,"' and an
opportunity to be heard-sometimes orally and sometimes in writing. Finally,
persons and companies may be entitled to diligent examination on the part of
the administration, to receive the agency's decision within a reasonable time,
and to a statement of reasons for the Commission's action. 2
The ECJ and CFI, like the U.S. Supreme Court in the venerable Londoner
and Bi-Metallic decisions, have not extended the right to be heard to the
promulgation of standards of a general or legislative nature. 3 In addition,
separation of functions challenges, parallel to the failed challenge in Withrow
v. Larkin,4 have been unsuccessful in the EU as well. 5 In Withrow, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the combined functions exercised by the Wisconsin
Medical Examining Board against the challenge that allowing this agency to
investigate a doctor's alleged misconduct and hold a disciplinary hearing on
whether or not his license should be suspended or revoked was
unconstitutional.8 6 The doctor-appellant was unable to show any bias and the
Supreme Court was reluctant to intrude because "[n]o single answer [on
combined functions] has been reached. Indeed, the growth, variety, and
complexity of the administrative processes have made any one solution highly
" The term Commission is being used in this Article to refer not only to the Commission but
also to those European agencies established by the Council and empowered to make adjudicatory
decisions in areas like competition, trademark law, food safety, and pharmaceutical licensing.
See id. at 39.
80 Id.
8' Id. at 47.
82 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 349 (discussing process rights, including transparency and the
right to diligent examination); Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 48-49. See generally
Mashaw, supra note 20, at 104-05 (arguing that requiring reasons to be given in the United
States and the EU serves to create authentic democratic governance); Widdershoven, supra
note 64, at 283.
83 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 319.
- 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
85 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 370-72.
86 421 U.S. at 38-39, 43.
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unlikely.,1 7 It did indicate, however, that its response would be different if the
same person served as both judge and prosecutor. 88
The similar challenge before the EU courts is that having the Commission
serve as both prosecutor and judge violates Article 6(1) of the Convention of
Human Rights (Convention) and its mandate that everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal.8 9 These challenges have failed, with the ECJ apparently accepting the
argument that the Commission is not a tribunal.9" In addition, the CFI has
noted that it exercises full powers ofjudicial review over the Commission and
that it is an independent and impartial court for purposes of the Convention. 9'
Nevertheless, in response to concerns about the Commission's authority, it has
appointed hearing officers to preside over competition proceedings to make
sure that the rights of defense are guaranteed, and since 2004, oral hearings in
competition cases have been conducted by an independent hearing officer.
92
As in United States due process jurisprudence, the full range of the rights
of defense protections will not necessarily be afforded in every case. There are
variations depending on the facts and the nature of the interests at stake.9 3
Similarly, the exact dimensions of those safeguards that are afforded will vary
depending on the context; for example, the agency's required explanation for
its decision might be relatively brief in some situations and very detailed in
others.94 Still, compliance with the right to be heard is so important that a
court may raise deprivations of this right on its own motion.95 In recognizing
the rights of defense, the EU courts have acknowledged that procedural
safeguards protect individuals against arbitrary and capricious administrative
actions96 and lead to more informed and better agency decisions, and the
17 Id. at 51.
81 Id. at 53.
89 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 370-71.
9 Id. at 370. Craig also points out that the ECJ's explanations on this subject have been
"terse." Id.
91 Case T-348/94, Enso Espafiola, S.A. v. Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. 11-1875, 11-1901-02.
92 Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 14, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18; CRAIG, supra note 19,
at 369, 371-72.
9' CRAIG, supra note 19, at 349-50. For instance, there might be a right to a reasoned
decision in a particular adjudication but no right to an oral hearing. Id. at 349.
14 See infra notes 203-19 and accompanying text.
95 See Case C-291/89, Interhotel v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2257, 1-2280.
96 To paraphrase a famous saying, " 'formality [or process] [is] the sworn enemy of the
arbitrary, and the twin sister of freedom [or fundamental fairness].'" SCHWARZE, supra note 22,
at 1178 (quoting RUDOLFVONJHERING, VONGEISTDEsROMISCHENRECHTS 471 (Basel, 1883)).
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resulting decisions are more likely to be accepted by affected persons.97 In
sum, administrative procedures ensure respect for the rule of law.98
Most components of the right to be heard were recognized initially by the
ECJ while reviewing Commission decisions that imposed fines and other
penalties on companies violating the EU's competition rules.99 The case law
coming from the competition sector arguably reflects the fact that this was one
of the few areas where the Commission could impose sanctions directly. °0
The right to be heard jurisprudence is not, however, restricted to this sector.
It has been recognized in other areas such as anti-dumping and customs
proceedings.'0 ' According to the ECJ, the rights of defense are to be respected
in all proceedings that could adversely affect an individual,'0 2 such as the
imposition of fines, penalties, and other forms of hardship.l"3
Notwithstanding the widespread recognition of the components of the right
to be heard discussed in the following sections, there is no uniform
administrative procedure in the EU. Since there is no EU equivalent to the
APA, the procedures followed in adjudications vary from sector to sector and
from agency to agency."° However, some of the principles announced by the
courts have been implemented legislatively in some sectors."0 5 Also, there is
not yet an EU decision that parallels Mathews v. Eldridge"6 and its test for
balancing the interests of a party in additional procedural protections against
the agency's interests and the cost of additional procedures.'0 7
97 See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 171 (2d
ed. 2001) (stating that known standards "are essential to an individual's effective and
comfortable participation in the agency's application of its standards").
9' See SCHWARZE, supra note 22, at 1179; CRAIG, supra note 19, at 360-61. Process rights
protect dignatory interests as well. Id. See also Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy,
Government Benefits and the Rule of Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Due
Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 107, 111-13 (2005); AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 97, at 170-72.
9 Widdershoven, supra note 64, at 282.
'o Id. See Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 15-16. Cf. Bignami, supra note 22, at 63.
10 Bignami, supra note 22, at 62, 66-67.
102 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 361.
03 Bignami, supra note 22, at 66.
'04 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 6 ("EC administrative procedure does not fit any
preestablished template.").
'0' See id. at 11.
106 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
107 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 362.
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B. Early Case Law: Triggering Acts
Courts in the United States must answer two questions to determine what
procedures, if any, are required by due process. First, does due process apply?
Second, if due process does apply, what procedures must be afforded to the
person appearing before the agency?"'8 In regards to the first question, the
action taken by the agency must deprive a person of a protected liberty or
property interest in order to trigger due process." 9 While there are many
decisions defining liberty and property interests, the members of the Supreme
Court have often disagreed about the precise nature of the interests that are
protected."' The Court has not, however, accepted the argument that any
government decision that has a significant adverse impact on an individual
should be protected by due process. "'
In contrast, a fairly persuasive argument can be made that-the ECJ has
recognized the principle that the rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard
are triggered by any governmental action that adversely impacts an individual
or that has some perceptible effect on a person's interests.12 Although most
ECJ decisions involve persons and undertakings that have suffered economic
injury resulting from unfair competition or the denial or revocation of a permit
or franchise, the language of many decisions is broad, requiring a "hearing
even where no sanction is imposed, provided that there is some adverse impact
or some significant effect on the applicant's interests ...""'
108 PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 15, at 232; Fox, supra note 1, at 110.
109 FOx, supra note 1, at 123-30.
"' Id. (discussing various circumstances that may trigger due process).
... PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 15, at 233-35,253-55 (discussing the views of
Professors Davis and Van Alstyne).
112 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 314, 361.
113 Id. at 361. We must not confuse the kind of adverse impact that triggers the right to be
heard with the kind of harm that would give a person standing to seek review. As in the United
States, there is a great deal of EU case law and literature on standing. Standing is not a problem
for a person who is being sanctioned or penalized by an individualized determination, but
attacking a quasi-legislative norm is difficult. Article 230(4) of the EC is the key. It states that
"[a]ny natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings against a
decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a
regulation or decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the
former." Consolidation Versions of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
art. 230, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 1, 126 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. This has been interpreted to mean
that persons other than those to whom an action is addressed can claim to be individually
concerned if the decision affects them "by reason of certain attributes peculiar to them, or by
reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other[s]." CRAIG, supra
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Transocean Marine Paint..4 is one of the most influential ECJ decisions in
the development of the rights of defense." 5 It involved an association of
marine paint manufacturers seeking to renew an exemption concerning an
agreement among them to restrict competition. The Commission had granted
this exemption several years earlier, but now it informed the association that
a simple renewal would not be possible for several reasons, including growth
of its membership and linkage between two members and large chemical
companies. It also indicated that the renewed exemption would be subject to
fresh conditions including the obligation to notify the Commission of "any
changes in the participatory relationships of the members.""' 6  The
Commission then renewed the exemption with a specific condition requiring
Transocean's members to inform it of "any links by way of common directors
or managers between a member of the Association and any other company or
firm in the paints sector[,] . . . including all changes in such links or
participations already in existence.""' 7
This specific condition apparently caught the association's members by
surprise because they asked the ECJ to annul it. They argued that the
condition had not been brought to their attention prior to the Commission's
decision and were therefore never given the opportunity to make their views
known on the subject. In essence, they could not infer from the Commission's
note 19, at 332 (discussing Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Comm'n, 1963 E.C.R. 95). In
essence, a generalized grievance shared by others similarly situated is not sufficient. As the
number of persons affected by a norm is increased, then the chances for effective judicial review
are diminished. The Plaumann decision has been criticized. Advocates General and others have
argued that indirect challenges by reference from proceedings in national courts pursuant to
Article 234 are ineffective and that standing for direct challenges pursuant to 230(4) should be
liberalized to a test based on substantial adverse impact. The ECJ has not, however, relaxed the
Plaumann court's interpretation of Article 230(4). Case C-50/00 P, Uni6n de Pequeflos
Agricultores v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. 1-667; Case C-263/02 P, Comm'n v. JMgo-Qu&6 & Cie
SA, 2004 E.C.R. 1-3425; CRAIG, supra note 19, at 332-44. The proposed Constitutional Treaty
contains a provision that liberalizes standing to some degree, but its future is uncertain. See
CRAIG, supra note 19, at 344. The rules relating to standing in the EU remain, in the words of
Professor Craig, "problematic." Id. at 347.
14 Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 1063.
15 See Bignami, supra note 22, at 64, 67 (explaining that Transocean was later codified by
Article 11-101 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, giving the decision constitutional status);
Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 37-39 (explaining that the ECJ later announced procedural
fairness principles of Transocean as "broad principles of Community Law"); infra note 126 and
accompanying text.
116 Transocean, 1974 E.C.R. at 1078. See also Bignami, supra note 22, at 64.
17 Transocean, 1974 E.C.R. at 1077.
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statements, which mentioned the possibility of fresh conditions, that this
objectionable condition would be imposed, and they would have voiced their
objections to the Commission had they known. They asserted that the
Commission violated its procedural rules."' In terms of American due process
jurisprudence, they were denied adequate notice and, as a result, they did not
have a meaningful opportunity to be heard regarding the objectionable
condition. That objectionable condition adversely affected their property
interest in their exemption from the EU's competition rules." 9
The ECJ agreed with Transocean. It noted that the Commission's
regulations required it, before making a decision, to give associations the
opportunity to be heard on matters to which the Commission objects, 2 ° and
that the Commission's regulations applied the "general rule" that
a person whose interests are perceptibly affected by a decision
taken by a public authority must be given the opportunity to make
his point of view known. This rule requires that an undertaking
be clearly informed, in good time, of the essence of conditions to
which the Commission intends to subject an exemption and it
must have the opportunity to submit its observations to the
Commission. This is especially so in the case of conditions
which.., impose considerable obligations having far-reaching
effects. 21
The Court did not specify the source of this general rule.'22 It
acknowledged that the Commission enjoys considerable discretion, but in this
situation, it agreed with Transocean that the challenged condition was not
suggested in the filed documents or in the hearing.'23 The Court emphasized
"18 Id. at 1077-78. Members argued that the obligation was not contained in the notice of
objections, and thus, they had no opportunity to make their views known. Id. at 1077.
"' See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("An
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information,
and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance." (citations
omitted)).
2' Transocean, 174 E.C.R. at 1079.
.2 Id. at 1080 (emphasis added).
122 Bignami, supra note 22, at 64.
2' Transocean, 1974 E.C.R. at 1080-81. The Commission was required to reach a "fresh
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the clear link between adequate notice and the right to be heard. A person
whose interests may be affected by an agency's decision has the right to make
his point of view known (an opportunity to be heard), and the meaningful
exercise of this right requires that person to be informed of the agency's
position (a right to notice).
This general rule became a "fundamental principle of Community law" in
Hoffinann-LaRoche & Co. v. Commission."4 Hoffnann-LaRoche, a Swiss
drug manufacturer, sought to annul a Commission decision regarding the
company's alleged abuses of its dominant position in the market for vitamins
and vitamin ingredients. The company asserted several grounds for annulment,
including irregularities in the Commission's administrative procedures by not
allowing it to inspect certain documents in the Commission's possession. 5
Even though the Court determined that the company had, in fact, seen the
documents relied upon by the Commission, it made the following statement:
Observance of the right to be heard is in all proceedings in which
sanctions, in particular fines or penalty payments, may be
imposed afundamental principle of Community law which must
be respected even if the proceedings in question are
administrative proceedings. . . .Thus it emerges from the
provisions quoted above [regulations as well as decisions] and
also from the general principle to which they give effect that in
order to respect the principle of the right to be heard the
undertakings concerned must have been afforded the opportunity
during the administrative procedure to make known their views
on the truth and relevance of ... the documents used by the
Commission to support its claim that there has been an
infringement of Article 86 of the Treaty. 126
The Court's statement in Hoffinan-LaRoche, that the right to be heard must
be respected in all administrative proceedings in which sanctions may be
imposed, is not as expansive as saying that any person who might be adversely
affected by administrative action has a right to be heard. However, it is a
strong statement about the importance of this fundamental principle in EU
decision" after hearing the association's suggestions. Id. at 1081.
124 Case 85/76, Hoffman-LaRoche & Co. v. Comm'n, 1979 ECJ CELEX
WESTLAW 676J0085 (Feb. 13, 1979).
125 Id. at * 7, 8.
126 Id. at T 9, 11 (emphasis added). See also Bignami, supra note 22, at 65.
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jurisprudence. Moreover, subsequent decisions, discussed below, show that
the right to be heard is triggered in a variety of contexts other than cases
involving the potential imposition of fines and penalties; they also demonstrate
that "adversely affected" and "perceptibly affected" have been given expansive
readings by the ECJ and the CFI. 12 7 The EU courts do not seem to be
struggling with defining liberty interests and property interests for the purpose
of determining what triggers the rights of defense.
C. Who Has a Right to Notice and an Opportunity to Be Heard?
1. Economic Harm as Adverse Impact
There is no doubt that the target of an administrative proceeding, be it a
company or an individual, has a right to notice and to be heard. When are
others entitled to these rights? In Commission v. Lisrestal, the ECJ stated:
Observance of the right to be heard is, in all proceedings initiated
against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure
adversely affecting that person, a fundamental principle of
Community law which must be guaranteed even in the absence
of any rules governing the proceedings in question .... That
principle requires that the addressees of decisions which
significantly affect their interests should be placed in a position
in which they may effectively make known their views.'28
This case involved companies that had applied for and received financial
assistance from the European Social Fund (Social Fund) to provide
employment opportunities in Portugal through vocational training. Before the
Social Fund paid the balance of the assistance to these companies, its auditors
determined that several of the recipients did not have sufficient staff or
infrastructure and that there had been improper invoices on some expenses.
The Social Fund communicated this information to a Portuguese agency that
in turn told the undertakings (beneficiaries of the financial assistance) that they
had to repay specific amounts to the Social Fund and a particular Portuguese
127 CRAIG,supra note 19, at 314-15.
128 Case C-32/95, Comm'n v. Lisrestal-Organizagdo Gestdo de Restaurantes Colectives
Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-5373,1-5396 (emphasis added). See also Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19,
at 44-45.
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authority. 129 The ECJ affirmed the CFI's determination that the undertakings'
rights of defense had been infringed. They had received a letter from the
Portuguese authority that merely informed them that there had been an
investigation to check on the implementation and legality of the program, but
there was no explanation of the Commission's reservations and suspicions. 3
The decision to reduce the subsidy and order repayment was adopted before
the beneficiaries had an opportunity to be heard by the Commission. This
action violated the beneficiaries' rights of defense notwithstanding practical
problems faced by the Commission in trying to consult the beneficiaries
directly. ''
Lisrestal shows that administrative action that might result in economic
harm to a person who applied for and received a benefit triggers the right to be
heard. Potential economic loss or hardship is the requisite adverse effect. The
undertakings that had received the financial assistance for their vocational
training projects became, in essence, targets of administrative action after the
auditors found financial irregularities, and they were adversely affected by the
Social Fund's determination.
In Air Inter SA, the CFI stated:
[I]t must be observed that the application of the fundamental
principle of the rights of the defence cannot be excluded or
restricted by any legislative provision. Respect for that principle
must therefore be ensured both where there is no specific
legislation and also where legislation exists which does not itself
take account of that principle.'32
In this case, the Commission decided to open particular air routes in France
after holding a fact-finding proceeding prompted by complaints from an air
carrier that French authorities had denied it access to the routes. The
legislation governing this agency proceeding did not provide for participation
129 Lisrestal, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-5375-76.
130 Id. at 1-5398.
131 Id. at 1-5374, 5398-99. See also CRAIG, supra note 19, at 315-16. See generally Case
T-42/96, Eyckeler & Malt AG v. Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. 11-401; CRAIG, supra note 19, at 365
(stating that the CFI in Eyckeler held "the regulatory scheme provided for contact between the
individual concerned and the national administration, and between the national administration
and the Commission, but there was no provision for [the applicant] to be heard before the
Commission"). Thus, the CFI held that the applicant was entitled to make its views known
regarding matters taken into account by the Commission.
132 Case T-260/94, Air Inter SA v. Comm'n, 1997 E.C.R. 11-997, 1018-19.
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by potentially affected companies, such as an existing franchisee on these
routes. Here, an air carrier that had the exclusive concession on those same
routes asserted that its rights of defense had been infringed by the
Commission's action ordering France to open the routes to other carriers. The
complaining carrier also emphasized it would be harmed by the new
competition. The CFI agreed.'33
Here again, possible financial losses due to increased competition would
have been the consequence of the challenged Commission decision. This
action triggered the rights of defense. The CFI said the carrier's right to be
heard could be observed either directly before the Commission or through
dealing with the French authorities. In any event, the air carrier had a right to
be heard before the adoption of a decision that would cause an adverse
economic impact.'34 The court ultimately concluded that the Commission and
French authorities had respected the carrier's right to be heard by following
procedures in deciding to open the particular routes to competition. 35
These pronouncements about the right to be heard were similar to
statements made in Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Commission. 36This was a
state aid case-a bilateral proceeding involving the Commission and the
member state granting a subsidy-involving the Commission's objections
about subsidies extended by the Netherlands to a messenger service company
under a Dutch law regulating postal services. The court held that the
Netherlands' right of defense had been infringed by an inadequate statement
of objections-a telex message that was too general-and the failure of the
Commission to afford it a further hearing to make its views known on certain
issues. 1'
Moreover, notwithstanding the silence of the rules and regulations
governing state aid proceedings in which a state aid determination may
potentially affect the rights of companies, the ECJ held that the direct
beneficiary of the challenged state aid, here the messenger service company,
was entitled to a specific statement of reasons and the right to be heard because
its economic interests were directly affected by the Commission's action.'38
133 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 45.
114 SeeAirlnterSA, 1997 E.C.R. at 1019-20.
'3 Id at II-1022, 1027.
136 Joined Cases C-48/90 and C-66/90, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Comm'n, 1992
E.C.R. 1-565, 638-40.
137 Id. at 1-638-40. See also CRAIG, supra note 19, at 363.
131 Netherlands, 1992 E.C.R. at 1-640. The company was directly named in the Dutch postal
law. Id.
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The Court stated that the Commission had informal discussions with the
company concerning problems raised by the Dutch postal law and competition
rules, but that the Commission never informed it "in precise terms of its
specific objections" to the state aid.139 In short, although the messenger service
had some idea that there could be a problem with its favored treatment under
Dutch postal law, it was entitled to know the Commission's precise objections.
This inadequate notice infringed the company's right to be heard. 4
2. Adverse Impact Other than Fines and Penalties
The right to a fair hearing outside the context of a proceeding that can result
in penalties was recognized in Al-Jubail Fertilizer Co. v. Council of the
European Communities.4' In 1986, the Commission instituted an anti-
dumping proceeding regarding imports of urea, a powdery compound used in
fertilizer, and later adopted a regulation imposing an anti-dumping duty.
Fertilizer companies from Saudi Arabia applied to annul or modify this
regulation, complaining that they had not received adequate disclosure of the
basis on which the Commission intended to take action, notwithstanding their
requests for information. Accordingly, they asserted that they had been denied
a right to be heard and could not effectively comment on the Commission's
findings.'42
The Advocate General noted that the challenged measure was adopted in
the form of a legislative provision and that the investigation was not
necessarily directed at specific undertakings like the Saudi companies. Still,
he asserted that the right of defense, as announced in Hoffinan-LaRoche,
applied to anti-dumping proceedings.'43 The Court agreed. It stated that the
right to a fair hearing must be observed "not only in the course of proceedings
which may result in the imposition of penalties, but also in investigative
proceedings prior to the adoption of anti-dumping regulations which, despite
their general scope, may directly and individually affect the undertakings
concerned and entail adverse consequences for them."'"
139 Id.
"4 Id. See also CRAIG, supra note 19, at 363-64 (discussing Case T-266/97, Vlaamse
Televisie Maatschappij NV v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 11-2329).
141 Case C-49/88, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3187, 3241. See also CRAIG, supra note 19, at 315.
142 Al-Jubail Fertilizer Co., 1991 E.C.R., at 1-3189-91.
113 Id. at 1-3222 (opinion of Advocate General Darmon).
144 Id. at 1-3241.
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Specifically, there was an obligation, subject to protecting business secrets,
to disclose information to the fertilizer companies so that they could defend
their interests and make their views known on the correctness and relevance
of the facts and circumstances presented to the Commission.'45 The anti-
dumping duty was annulled as to the Saudi companies. 4 6 Here, as in penalty
cases, the adverse effect the Saudi companies would have suffered as a result
of the agency action was financial, i.e., paying a higher duty on their fertilizer
that was exported to the EU.
3. Hearings for Rejected Applicants
The due process rights of applicants for licenses, franchises, and other
government benefits are uncertain.'47 Section 555(e) of the APA provides that
rejected applicants and petitioners for agency action are entitled to a brief
statement of grounds for the denial, 4 ' but the United States Supreme Court has
not extended due process rights to applicants for benefits.'49 An argument
against such an extension of due process is that an applicant who does not
satisfy all the criteria necessary for receiving the benefit has failed to establish
a property interest in that benefit. 51 In contrast, although the ECJ also has
been reluctant to extend the right to be heard to disappointed applicants for
individual benefits and privileges like franchises and subsidies, it has
mandated hearings upon a showing of adverse impact to the person's legal
position."'
Applicants are granted hearing rights in some sectors. For instance,
regulations provide that rejected applicants for trademarks are entitled to file
observations and sometimes have an oral hearing. Similarly, applicants to the
Committee for Medical Products for Human Use are entitled to submit written
'45 Id. See also Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 41.
'46 AI-Jubail Fertilizer Co., 1991 E.C.R. at 1-3243.
141 See generally Shapiro & Levy, supra note 98, at 110-17.
14' 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2006).
149 ROGERS, HEALY & KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 14, at 59; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 61 n.13 (1999); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986).
1so Cf Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 61. But see Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115
(9th Cir. 1998), vacated, 526 U.S. 1096 (1999) (holding that due process requires the
Department of Health and Human Services to issue and enforce a set of procedural safeguards
that HMOs must use in the process of deciding whether to deny a medical procedure to a
Medicare beneficiary).
151 Bignami, supra note 22, at 66-67.
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comments and to have an oral hearing. 52 In customs disputes that are
considered by the Commission, the ECJ has held that an undertaking seeking
an exemption from duties has the right to have its case examined carefully and
impartially, to make its views known, and to receive a reasoned decision. '53
For instance, in one customs case, the issue was whether an electron
microscope, similar to one a university wanted to import from Japan, was
manufactured in the Community. 154 If one was not available, then the Japanese
model could be imported duty-free. Accordingly, the Commission's decision
on this issue would have a financial impact on the university-the applicant
for the exemption. The ECJ had no difficulty concluding that the university's
right to be heard included making its views known on the circumstances and
on the documents taken into account by the decision makers. '55 Similarly, the
CFI has held that importers who apply to the Commission for the repayment
or remission of customs duties have a right to make their views known. '56 The
potential adverse impact is financial-the applicant for relief paid a customs
duty that it regarded as too high or improper and is subsequently seeking
remission of those funds.
Some disappointed applicants have not been afforded hearings. For
instance, Windpark Groothusen v. Commission involved a German company
that applied for financial assistance to help its construction of a wind park.'
The application was submitted pursuant to a special EU initiative to promote
energy technology in which the Commission published an invitation for
interested parties to submit projects for possible financial support.'58
Eligibility conditions, selection criteria, and an application procedure were
published. The Commission received seven hundreds proposals, including
fifty-two in the field of wind energy. A technical committee on wind energy
examined these applications, granted financial support to eleven, and placed
eight on a reserve list. The German company was informed that it was on the
reserve list, but was later told that it would not receive any funding.' 59 It then
brought an annulment action in the Court of First Instance, alleging that its
152 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 46.
153 See, e.g., Case C-269/90, Hauptzollamt Mfinchen-Mitte v. Technische Universitdit
Miinchen, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5469.
154 Id.
"' Id. at 1-5501. See Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 43.
156 See, e.g., Case T-42/96, Eyckeler & Malt AG v. Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. 11-401, 424-25.
151 Case C-48/96, Windpark Groothusen GrnBH & Co. Betriebs KG v. Comm'n, 1998
E.C.R. 1-2873.
158 Id. at 1-2877.
"9 Id. 1-2878-79.
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right to be heard had been infringed. The CFI dismissed the action and the
ECJ affirmed, stating: 6'
A person's right to a hearing before adoption of an act
concerning that person arises only where the Commission
contemplates the imposition of a penalty or the adoption of a
measure likely to have an adverse effect on that person's legal
position. As regards, in particular, the procedure for the selection
of projects to receive funding as part of the promotion of energy
technology in Europe... , where the number of participants is
high, the fact that, once their project has been submitted,
candidates are not as a general rule given further opportunity to
express their views during the selection procedure is explained,
moreover, by the work entailed in evaluating a large number of
projects. 1" 1
It is not surprising that both the CFI and the ECJ concluded that
Windpark's right to be heard had not been violated given the high number of
applicants, the fact that the applicants were aware in advance of the criteria for
selecting the various projects, and the fact that special committees evaluated
the many applications. Moreover, the applicant's legal position was not in any
way affected by the rejection, and the agency action did not subject it to any
kind of fine or penalty. Another way to explain this outcome is that the
selection process afforded Windpark and other applicants due process because
the selection criteria and application procedure were published, the
applications were reviewed impartially bytechnical committees with expertise,
and rejected applicants received a brief explanation for the decision. In sum,
the selection process was rational and fair. 62
However, it is not clear how the ECJ and CFI would treat a single
disappointed applicant for a particular license or a rejected undertaking
seeking permission to market a product.'63 Is denial of the benefit or rejection
'60 Id. para. 2.
161 Id. at 1-2875.
162 This approach arguably satisfies the standards-based approach to due process
recommended by Professors Shapiro & Levy. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 98, at 110. See,
e.g., Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968). See also infra
notes 203-19 and accompanying text (discussing the EU's fair hearing requirement for a
statement of reasons).
163 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 46.
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of an application a sufficient adverse affect to trigger at least some minimal
protection, such as providing the disappointed applicant with an explanation
of the denial? The ECJ's case law on reasoned decisions shows that the
specificity and detail that is required of the explanation depends on the
circumstances, and that in many situations, a brief explanation will be
sufficient.1" After all, the Treaty Establishing the European Community
establishes a right to a statement of reasons,'65 and a brief explanation would
seem to be required by an agency's duty to act fairly.'"
As noted above, the ECJ and CFI's uncertainty regarding applicants and the
right to be heard parallels, to some degree, questions about the due process
rights of applicants for licenses, franchises, and benefits in the United States.
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Board of Regents v. Roth, stated that in his
view,
Every [person] who applies for a government job is entitled to it
unless the government can establish some reason for denying the
employment. This is the 'property' right that I believe is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that cannot be
denied 'without due process of law.' And it is also liberty -
liberty to work - which is the 'very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity' secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.
... Thus, when an application for public employment is
denied or the contract of a government employee is not renewed,
the government must say why, for it is only when the reasons
underlying government action are known that citizens feel secure
and protected against arbitrary government action. 67
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not extended due process rights to
applicants for benefits, 6 ' a strong argument can be made that due process
requires governmental authorities to treat applicants for benefits fairly and to
make selections among multiple applicants for limited funds or among several
candidates for a finite number of positions in accordance with ascertainable
and rational standards.'69 Perhaps this can be extended to include a duty to
164 See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
165 EC Treaty art. 253, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 1, 143.
'66 Cf Mashaw, supra note 20, at 120-21.
167 408 U.S. 564, 589 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
168 See supra note 149.
169 See, e.g., Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 609-10 (5th Cir. 1964) (stating that a
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give reasons. Moreover, the perceived burden of giving reasons for all
decisions is slight when there are, in fact, reasons for a rejection or denial. 7 '
The APA provides that anyone denied an application or petition is at least
due a "brief statement of the grounds for denial."'' This is not, however,
required by due process; it is a statutory requirement.' 72 In contrast, the duty
of EU agencies to state reasons for their actions is codified at Article 253 of
the EC Regulations.' 73 This duty is regarded as an "essential procedural
requirement."' 74 A statement of reasons enables persons affected by a decision
to defend their rights; it helps courts supervise the work of agencies; and it
provides guidance to citizens, the EU's member states, and others so they can
see that the law is being applied fairly.' This duty is related to the principle
of procedural legal certainty that is observed in the EU. This principle requires
that decisions must be clear and definite and that time limits are observed and
enforced.'76
4. Legislative Determinations and the Rights of Defense
Like the U.S. Supreme Court in the venerable Londoner and Bi-Metallic
decisions, holding that due process does not apply to rule-making as opposed
to adjudication, the ECJ and the CFI have not extended the right to be heard
to the promulgation of standards of a general or legislative nature.'77 The ECJ
has stated that the right to be heard relates only to Commission actions of a
direct and individual concern 7' and not to a measure setting economic policy
and applying to all persons or undertakings situated similarly to the
deprivation of due process occurs when a state board denies a liquor license without a hearing
and without established regulations pertaining to license approval and denial), reh 'g denied, 330
F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1964) ("[E]very applicant should be apprised of the qualifications
necessary to obtain a license and should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to show that he
or she does or does not meet them."); Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d
Cir. 1968) (stating that housing authority's selection of applicants must be guided by
ascertainable standards). See also Shapiro & Levy, supra note 98, at 110 & 138 n. 164.
"70 Roth, 408 U.S. at 591 (Marshall J., dissenting). See also Mashaw, supra note 20, at 119.
5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2006).
7 Fox, supra note 1, at 138 & n.70.
'13 Widdershoven, supra note 64, at 289.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 285. See also infra notes 203-19 and accompanying text. See generally Mashaw,
supra note 20, at 116-24 (discussing what makes reason-giving legitimizing).
17 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 319.
78 Case C-104/97, Atlanta AG v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 1-6983, 1-7027.
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challenger.'79 The ECJ also said that there is no provision of Community law
entitling an undertaking to a right to be heard when the Commission was
adopting a regulation or a norm of a legislative nature, even when the
undertaking was directly and individually concerned with the measure in
question. 80 Moreover, the ECJ and the CFI have made clear that the fact a
person participated in the process leading up to the adoption of a general act
does not give them standing to challenge that act.181
D. Preliminary Investigations and the Right to Be Heard
Investigations have a significant role in administrative proceedings in the
EU.'82 For instance, a complaint about a company's alleged anti-competitive
practices may result in an investigation followed by notice to the target
company setting forth the agency's tentative objections. Similarly, there might
be an investigation following a company's application for a permit or
license.183 An investigation could result in the agency's decision to notify the
company that it intends to reject the application. The notice that triggers the
right to be heard often comes after the completion of an investigation by the
agency and the agency's submission of a statement of objections to the target
undertaking.'8 4
In some sectors, such as competition and anti-dumping, regulations provide
explicitly for preliminary investigations."' An investigation, such as the
examination of books and business records or entrance upon premises or land
to investigate, 186 can be a substantial interference with the rights and interests
of the undertaking subject to the investigation. However, an administrative
"9 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 317.
ISO Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. 11-3305, 3479.
1 Case C-263/02, Comm'n v. JMgo-Qudrd & Cie SA, 2004 E.C.R. 1-3425, 3462--63; Case
T-585/93, Greenpeace Int'l v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 11-2205,2229. See generally CRAIG, supra
note 19, at 319-22 (arguing for enhancing participation rights when general measures are being
enacted).
82 A great deal of EU administrative procedure follows the continental criminal
inquisitorial/investigatorial model with staff for the relevant section of the Commission
conducting an investigation of a proposed enforcement or of an applicant that concludes with
a notice to the target or applicant setting forth the Commission's tentative findings. Asimow &
Dunlop, supra note 19, at 14.
183 Id. at 11-12, 35.
'84 SCHWARZE, supra note 22, at 1335-36; Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 35.
185 SCHWARZE, supra note 22, at 1336-37.
186 Commission officials can carryout investigations pursuant to Article 14 orRegulation 17.
Id. at 1329.
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authority's decision to commence an investigation does not necessarily trigger
rights of defense such as receiving prior notice of the investigation or an
opportunity to be heard prior to the investigation.
For example, the Commission sent inspectors to National Panasonic's
offices in Slough, England without prior notice, after it had learned from
Panasonic's German subsidiary about an agreement relating to product
distribution. National Panasonic raised several objections to this inspection,
including infringement of its right to receive advance notice of the
Commission's intention to apply a decision against it and infringement of its
right to be heard before being adversely affected by a decision. It asserted a
right to request a stay of execution of the decision.'87 The ECJ did not accept
these arguments, stating that the right of defense "is chiefly incorporated in
legal or administrative procedures for the termination of an infringement or for
a declaration that an agreement, decision or concerted practice is
incompatible" with EU competition law.' In contrast, the sole objective of
the investigation procedure is to
enable the Commission to gather the necessary information to
check the actual existence and scope of a given factual and legal
situation. Only if the Commission considers that the data for the
appraisal thereof collected in this way justify the initiation of a
procedure . . . must the undertaking... concerned be heard
before such a decision is taken... .189
Using language similar to the U.S. Supreme Court's explanation of
warrantless administrative inspections in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.,'9 the ECJ
said that the purpose of carrying out this investigation at Panasonic's Slough
office without warning was to prevent the possible destruction or concealment
of documents. Moreover, if it was later determined that this decision to
investigate was unlawful, a court could order the Commission to return
documents and refrain from using any of the information it obtained
improperly.' 9' In essence, National Panasonic had a right to be heard before
it was held liable for violating the EU's competition rules, but its rights to
187 Case 136/79, Nat'l Panasonic, Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1980 E.C.R. 2033, 2056.
188 Id. at 2058.
189 Id.
9 See 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978); see also David E. Shipley, Warrantless Administrative
Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 81, 98 (1979).
191 Nat'l Panasonic, 1980 E.C.R. at 2068-69 (opinion of Advocate General Warner).
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notice and a hearing were not infringed by the Commission's initial decision
to investigate whether there was a basis for filing a notice of objections
regarding National Panasonic's competitive practices.
Similarly, the Commission's decision, after conducting an investigation to
formally commence a proceeding by notifying a company of its statement of
objections regarding its marketing practices, did not violate a company's right
of defense according to the decision in IBMv. Commission.'92 In other words,
a company is not entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before an
agency decides to institute a proceeding against it. The filing of a statement
of objections "does not compel the undertaking concerned to alter or
reconsider its marketing practices and it does not have the effect of depriving
it of the protection hitherto available to it against the application of a
fine ... "'193 Moreover, the Court explained:
An application for a declaration that the initiation of a procedure
and a statement of objections are void might make it necessary
for the Court to arrive at a decision on questions on which the
Commission has not yet had an opportunity to state its position
and would as a result anticipate the arguments on the substance
of the case, confusing different procedural stages both
administrative and judicial. It would thus be incompatible with
the system of the division of powers between the Commission
and the Court and of the remedies laid down by the Treaty, as
well as the requirements of the sound administration of justice
and the proper course of the administrative procedure to be
followed in the Commission.'94
The National Panasonic and IBMcases are analogous to the U.S. Supreme
Court's decisions in FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California and Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. '95 In FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California, the
Supreme Court held that the issuance of a complaint by the Federal Trade
Commission was not final agency action subject to review under the APA prior
to the conclusion of the agency adjudication. In response to Standard Oil's
argument that it would be harmed by having to defend the administrative
192 Case 60/81, 1981 E.C.R. 11-2639.
193 Id. at 11-2654.
194 Id.
'9' FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of S. Cal., 449 U.S. 232 (1980); Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
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action, the Court stated, "the expense and annoyance of litigation is 'part of the
social burden of living under government.' ,196
In Myers, the Court turned to the exhaustion doctrine as a basis for refusing
to enjoin the National Labor Relations Board from holding a hearing on unfair
labor practices charges against Bethlehem Shipbuilding. The Court said that
to rule in Bethlehem Shipbuilding's favor would "in effect substitute the
District Court for the Board as the tribunal to hear and determine what
Congress declared the Board exclusively should hear and determine in the first
instance." '197
These two cases and others show that courts in the United States ordinarily
will refuse to intervene during the preliminary stages of an administrative
investigation and adjudication because the claim is not ripe or final or because
the complainant has not exhausted remedies. An American court would rarely
turn to procedural due process jurisprudence to justify its refusal to intervene.
Still, the outcome is the same as in EU cases. Courts in the United States, like
the ECJ and the CFI, are reluctant to grant interim legal protection and will
ordinarily require a party to wait for the final decision before allowing the
agency to file its challenge or seeking judicial review. 98 The formal
commencement of a procedure by the communication of a statement of
objections triggers the right to be heard, but the decision to initiate the action
cannot be reviewed by a court until the administrative proceeding has run its
course.
IV. COMPONENTS OF THE RIGHTS OF DEFENSE
A. Adequate Notice
The ECJ and CFI have acknowledged that the right to be heard-to make
your views known about proposed administrative action-is meaningless
without adequate notice. These courts have insisted that notice of the nature
of the case must be given and that the target individual or undertaking must
have a right to respond to that notice. 99
96 Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 244 (quoting Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938)).
'9' Myers, 303 U.S. at 50.
198 Cf SCHWARZE, supra note 22, at 1331.
'" CRAIG, supra note 19, at 363.
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The ECJ defined several aspects of the adequate notice component of the
rights of defense in 1970, in ACF Chemiefarma NV v. Commission.2"0 This
was an application by a company based in Amsterdam to annul or amend a
Commission decision rendered in 1969. The Commission opposed
Chemiefarma's and other undertakings' fixed prices and quotas for the export
of quinine and quinidine, and following a hearing, the Commission imposed
fines on several of them. The applicant, Chemiefarma, made several
arguments for annulment. Chemiefarma's argued that by not allowing it to
consult essential documents and by violating several regulations, the
company's rights of defense were infringed because Chemiefarma was given
insufficient information about the objections lodged against it and the
evidentiary basis for the complaints.0 1 In ruling that the submissions were
unfounded, the Court made this general statement about the need for adequate
notice:
Respect for the rights of defence requires that in its notice of
complaints the Commission shall set forth clearly albeit
succinctly the essential facts on which it relies and that in the
course of the administrative procedure it shall supply the other
details which may be necessary for the defence of the persons
concerned.202
The ECJ elaborated on the need for an adequate statement of objections, in
Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Commission.2"3 This was an action to
annul a Commission decision ordering Imperial Chemicals to pay a
considerable fine for fixing prices for dyestuffs in violation of Article 85(1) of
the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community. Imperial
Chemical alleged procedural errors on the part of the Commission in its notice
of objections and its final decision, including the decision's reference to facts
200 See Case 41/69, 1970 E.C.R. 661, 684.
201 Id. at 669-73.
202 Id. at 662.
The rights of defence ... are respected if the decision does not allege that
the persons concerned have committed infringements other than those referred
to in the notice of complaints and only takes into consideration facts on which
the persons concerned have had the opportunity of making known their views
orally or in writing.
Id. See also Case 45/69, Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Comm'n, 1970 E.C.R. 769, 770.
203 Case 48/69, 1972 E.C.R. 619, 650-52.
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which did not appear in the notice of objections. 2" Imperial Chemical
contended that these procedural errors prevented it from responding to and
commenting on the notice of objections and that the Commission adopted its
decision before Imperial Chemical could make known its observations on the
draft minutes of the hearing. The Court ruled that Imperial Chemical's
submissions were unfounded but stated that the notice of objections is the
measure stating the attitude of the Commission concerning companies against
which proceedings have been commenced. If a company continues or repeats
prohibited actions during the period between the Commission's decision to
commence the action and receiving the Commission's notice of objections, the
company's rights of defense are not prejudiced by having the Commission take
facts of those repeated violations into account while preparing the notice of
objections.2"5 After all, those violations are simply a continuation of earlier
actions, and the Commission's consideration of the subsequent violations
accords with principles of administrative economy.2"6 Moreover, Imperial
Chemical's rights of defense were not infringed even though the final decision
referred to facts not in the notice of objections because it was sufficient that
the company was informed of the "essential elements of fact on which the
objections are based."2 7 In short, the record showed that the facts taken into
account by the Commission in ruling against Imperial Chemical were stated
adequately in the notice of objections.20 8
In a later decision, the Court stated:
It is clear from previous decisions of the Court that the statement
of objections must set forth clearly all the essential facts upon
which the Commission is relying at that stage of the procedure.
That may be done summarily and the decision is not necessarily
required to be a replica of the Commission's statement of
objections.20 9
On the other hand, there are limits on how far this principle can be
stretched. A notice that is too general or lacking in sufficient detail can
204 Id. at 635-36.
205 Id. at 650-51.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 621.
208 Id. at 650-51. See also SCHWARZE, supra note 22, at 1338-41.
209 Joined Cases 100-103/80, SA Musique Diffusion Frangaise v. Conn'n, 1983
E.C.R. 1825, 1881-82.
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infringe the rights of defense, 21" and the ECJ has stated in several cases that
matters not contained in the notice of objections may not be dealt with by the
Commission.211
The Transocean case, discussed earlier, also discusses the notice
requirement. In that case, an association of marine paint manufacturers sought
to renew an exemption from the EU's competition rules. The Commission
informed them that a simple renewal would not be possible and that a renewed
exemption would be subject to fresh conditions, including the obligation to
notify the Commission of any changes in the participatory relationships of the
association's members.212 The Commission then renewed the exemption with
a specific condition requiring the association's members to inform the
Commission of" 'any links by way of common directors or managers between
a member of the Association and any other company or firm in the paints
sector[,] ... including all changes in such links or participations already in
existence.' ,213
The Transocean applicants asked the ECJ to annul the renewed exemption,
arguing that the new conditions had not been brought to their attention prior
to the Commission's decision, and thus, "they were never given the
opportunity to make their views known on this subject., 214 The Transocean
applicants further stated that they could not infer from the Commission's
statements regarding the imposition of fresh conditions that this particular
condition might be imposed, and that they would have voiced their objections
to the Commission had they known about the condition. In general,
Transocean argued that the Commission violated its procedural rules.2 15
In ruling for Transocean, the ECJ acknowledged that the Commission
enjoys considerable discretion but that it is important for the Commission to
do a preliminary canvassing of objections that might be raised by companies
prior to exercising its discretionary powers. It agreed with Transocean that the
challenged condition was not suggested in the filed documents or in the
hearing.216 The association had not received adequate notice.
210 Joined Cases C-48 & 66/90, Netherlands v. Comm'n, 1992 E.C.R. 1-565, 638-40.
21 Case 45/69, Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Comm'n, 1970 E.C.R. 769, 795.
2 Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 1063, 1078. See
also Bignami, supra note 22, at 64.
213 Transocean, 1974 E.C.R. at 1077.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 1078.
216 Id. at 1080-81. The Commission was required to reach a fresh decision after hearing the
association's suggestions. Id. at 1081.
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B. The Opportunity to Make Your Views Known
The ECJ emphasized in Transocean the clear link between adequate notice
and the right to be heard. A person whose interests may be affected by an
agency's decision has the right to make his point of view known, and the
meaningful exercise of this right requires that person to be informed of the
agency's position. The "general rule" that persons affected by public authority
must have an opportunity to make their views known became a "fundamental
principle of Community law" in Hoffinann-LaRoche v. Commission:217
Observance of the right to be heard is in all proceedings in which
sanctions, in particular fines or penalty payments, may be
imposed a fundamental principle of community law which must
be respected even if the proceedings in question are
administrative proceedings. . . . Thus it emerges from the
provisions quoted above [regulations as well decisions] and also
from the general principle to which they give effect that in order
to respect the principle of the right to be heard the undertakings
concerned must have been afforded the opportunity during the
administrative procedure to make known their views on the truth
and relevance of... the documents used by the Commission to
support its claim that there has been an infringement of Article 86
of the Treaty.218
The Court elaborated on this right in SA Musique Diffusion Franqaise v.
Commission."1 9 This was a complex competition case regarding price fixing for
high-fidelity sound-reproduction equipment imported from Japan. Substantial
fines were imposed. The applicants, raised a variety of arguments for annulment
including infringement of essential procedural rights.22° The court first rejected
Musique Diffusion Frangaise's (MDF) argument that the Commission's role as
both prosecutor and judge violated the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights.22" ' It then noted that regulations required the Commission,
217 Hoffman-LaRoche & Co. v. Comm'n, 1979 ECU. CELEX WESTLAW 676J0085
(Feb. 13, 1979). See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
218 Hoffinann-LaRoche & Co., 1979 ECJ CELEX WESTLAW 676J0085, *I 9, 11. See also
Bignami, supra note 22, at 65.
219 Joined Cases 100-103/80, 1983 E.C.R. 1825.
220 Id. at 1877-78.
221 Id. at 1880. See also CRAIG, supra note 19, at 370-72. The challenge is that having the
[Vol. 37:1
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BEFORE EU AGENCIES
before rendering a decision, to give concerned parties an opportunity to be
heard on matters to which the Commission had taken objection; it also noted
that the proceedings were adversarial. In appropriate cases-particularly when
fines might be imposed--companies can be afforded an oral hearing.
Moreover, the Commission's decision could deal only with those objections
against the undertakings on which they had been afforded the opportunity to
make their views known.22 The Court explained that Hoffinan-LaRoche made
this a fundamental principle of Community law, and that the right to a fair
hearing meant that the undertaking was entitled "to make known its views on
the truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the
documents used by the Commission to support its claim that there has been an
infringement of the Treaty." '23  The court ultimately rejected MDF's
procedural objections.
The application of the right to be heard outside the competition sector was
224recognized in Fiskano AB v. Commission. In this case, a Swedish fishing
boat was in a Netherlands fishing zone when it was inspected by Dutch
authorities and, since the vessel was not on a list Dutch authorities had
received from the Commission, was treated as unlicensed. 25 After the
Commission was informed of this, it sent a letter to Swedish authorities stating
that the boat was engaged in illegal fishing and that it would not be considered
for a new license for twelve months.226 Fiskano, the owner of the boat,
challenged this action alleging, among other things, that its right to be heard
Commission serve as both prosecutor and judge violates Article 6(1) of the Convention of
Human Rights and its mandate that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal. These challenges have failed with the
ECJ apparently accepting the argument that the Commission is not a tribunal. Id. at 370. The
CFI has noted that it exercises full powers ofjudicial review over the Commission and that it is
the independent and impartial court for purposes of the Convention. Case T-348/94, Enso
Espafiola SA v. Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. 11-1875, 1901-02. There are parallels here with the
Supreme Court's decision in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) that upheld the combined
functions exercised by the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board against the challenge that
allowing the entity to both investigate a doctor's conduct and then adjudicate his case was
unconstitutional.
.2 Joined Cases 100-103/80, SA Musique Diffusion Frangaise v. Comm'n, 1983
E.C.R. 1825, 1881-84.
223 Id. at 1880-81. See also CRAIG, supra note 19, at 370.
224 Case C-135/92, Fiskano AB v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2885. See also CRAIG, supra
note 19, at 364; Bignami, supra note 22, at 66 (discussing cases in the anti-dumping and customs
sectors).
225 Fiskano AB, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2885, 2901.
226 Id. at 1-2902.
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had been infringed because it was not given a chance to submit its views
before the decision was adopted.227 The court agreed and annulled the
decision:22
It must be stressed in this respect that observance of the right
to be heard is, in all proceedings initiated against a person which
are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that
person, a fundamental principle of Community law which must
be guaranteed even in the absence of any rules governing the
procedure in question.
It follows ... [that] the right to be heard requires that any
person on whom a penalty may be imposed must be placed in a
position in which he can effectively make known his views of the
matters on the basis of which the Commission imposes the
penalty.229
The scope of the right to make your views known is not as extensive in
other sectors as it is in competition and anti-dumping cases. In general, the
parties are entitled to a brief description of the facts and the reasons for the
agency's proposed decision, to present their evidence and arguments in writing
before the agency decides the matter, and to a reply from the agency with a
statement of reasons. 30 The right to be heard as it has evolved in the EU does
not mandate an oral hearing in all cases.23 ' For example, while recognizing an
importer's right to make its views known when it applies for repayment of
custom duties, the CFI did not mandate an oral hearing unless the applicant
could show that a paper hearing would not be adequate. 2 In the absence of
sector-specific legislation mandating an oral proceeding,233 the Commission
ordinarily makes the call on whether to provide an oral hearing or whether the
submission of written comments is sufficient. However, as noted above in the
discussion of Musique Diffusion,234 the courts retain authority to hold that a
227 Id. at 1-2909.
228 Id. at 1-2909-10.
229 Id. at 1-2909 (citations omitted). See also Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 44 n. 108.
230 Bignami, supra note 22, at 67.
231 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 365; SCHWARZE, supra note 22, at 1363-64.
232 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 44 n.107 (discussing Joined Cases T-134-135/03,
Common Market Fertilizers v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3923).
233 For example, in competition cases, an independent officer presides over oral hearings. See
Bignami, supra note 22, at 65.
234 See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
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particular set of facts requires holding an oral proceeding, 2"5 such as in cases
where a fine might be imposed.236
C. Access to Documents and Rights of Defense
Access to the agency's file is a vital component of the right to be heard in
the EU because it is difficult to effectively challenge the agency's position
without having access to the agency's evidentiary record. Access to the
administration's file facilitates an individual's ability to respond, to ask
questions, and to point out flaws in the administration's position.237
This right was developed initially in competition cases and has been
recognized in other sectors.23 ' The right of access goes beyond discovery, in
which the person must seek documents from the administrative authority.
Rather, it is a part of a right to good administration that is included in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights: "[E]very person [has the right] to have access
to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality and
of professional and business secrecy ....239
For example, Solvay v. Commission 240 is a competition case involving the
manufacturing of synthetic soda ash in which Solvay, the target of the
Commission's action, alleged several infringements of its rights of defense due
to restricted access to the Commission's files.241' The CFI agreed with Solvay
and made the following statement:
235 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 365.
236 SCHWARZE, supra note 22, at 1363-64 (citing Case 209/78 Van Landewyck v.
Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 3125 (opinion of Advocate General Reischl)); Bignami, supra note 22,
at 66. This oral hearing may provide an opportunity to ask questions and probe the position
taken by the agency. See CRAIG, supra note 19, at 369. This does not seem to be cross-
examination as we know it in the United States. Of course, due process does not require cross-
examination in all cases. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). Even under the
APA's provisions for formal adjudications, there is no absolute right to cross-examination. See
ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUALON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 78 (1947); 5 U.S.C.
§ 556(d) (2006).
237 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 365. See also supra note 189.
238 Bignami, supra note 22, at 64-65 (discussing the evolution of the right of access in
competition cases); CRAIG, supra note 19, at 367-68.
239 Charter, art. 41,2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 18; CRAIG, supra note 19, at 366-67. The principle
of transparency is of vital importance in the EU, and transparency relates to the right of access
to documents as well as to concerns about open meetings and open records. CRAIG, supra
note 19, at 351, 359-60.
240 Case T-30/91, 1995 E.C.R. 11-1775.
24 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 39-40.
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[T]he purpose of providing access to the file in competition cases
is to enable addressees of statements of objections to examine
evidence in the Commission's file so that they are in a position
effectively to express their views on the conclusions reached by
the Commission in its statement of objections on the basis of that
evidence. Access to the file is thus one of the procedural
safeguards intended to protect the rights of the defence.242
The CFI recognized that just as adequate notice is essential to a meaningful
right to be heard, so is having access to the materials in the file upon which the
agency is basing its objections.
The CFI also discussed the doctrine of equality of arms in Solvay, the
principle that the information available to the Commission and to the target
company should be the same.243 It said this principle required the
Commission's target to be able to assess the probative value of the documents
obtained from other undertakings that had not been annexed to the
Commission's statement of objections. It was not acceptable that the
Commission, while investigating, decided for itself whether to use certain
documents to prove its case rather than give the target an opportunity to decide
whether other documents could help its defense. The Commission should have
given the target a sufficiently detailed list that would enable it to decide
whether to request access to particular documents. 2"
Similar statements were made in SA Hercules Chemicals NV v.
Commission.24 5 The court explained that the Commission must not depart from
its own rules in competition cases.246 It has an obligation to make available to
undertakings all documents, whether in the Commission's favor or otherwise,
which it obtained during the investigation, save for business secrets of other
242 Solvay, 1995 E.C.R. at 11-1802 (citations omitted).
243 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 40.
244 Case T-30/91, 1995 E.C.R. 11-1775, 1818. The Court recognized that creating these lists
was a burden for the Commission but that the right of defense had to be respected. See also
Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 40 n.93 and accompanying text; CRAIG, supra note 19,
at 367.
245 Case T-7/89, 1991 E.C.R. II-1711.
246 Id. at 11-1739. Agencies in the United States are under an obligation to follow the rules
and regulations they promulgate. An agency's failure to follow its own regulations "tends to
cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice," and consequently may result in violation
of a person's right to due process. NLRB v. Welcome-Am. Fertilizer Co., 443 F.2d 19, 20 (9th
Cir. 1971). See also Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954); Sameena, Inc. v. U.S.
Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998).
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companies and confidential documents.247 The right of defense would be
infringed if the Commission were to deny access to documents that might be
detrimental to its own case.248
A l-Jubail Fertilizer Co. v. Council of the European Communities,24 9 a 1991
ECJ decision that recognized the right to be heard in an anti-dumping
proceeding, also addressed a company's right of access to materials in the
Commission's file. Saudi companies, in seeking to annul an anti-dumping
duty, complained that they had not received adequate disclosure of the basis
on which the Commission intended to take action. In particular, they insisted
on disclosure of information about European costs of fertilizer production and
prices of fertilizer that arguably supported the Commission's conclusion that
the domestic fertilizer industry was being injured by dumping. Without this
information, the Saudi companies argued, they could not effectively comment
on the Commission's findings.250
The Court agreed with the Saudi companies.' Specifically, it held that
there was an obligation, subject to protecting business secrets, to disclose
information to the fertilizer companies so that they could defend their interests
and make their views known on the correctness and relevance of the facts and
circumstances presented to the Commission.2 12 The anti-dumping duty was
annulled as to the Saudi companies. 3
The Commission's obligations in regard to an undertaking's rights of
defense and the requirement that the Commission make documents available
for inspection may at times conflict with the Commission's obligation to
protect confidential information and business secrets contained in documents
247 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 366. This is part of the wider principle of equality of arms. Id.
The failure to disclose in Hercules was not prejudicial because seeing the responses of other
targets to the statement of objections would not have led to a different result. Hercules
Chemical, 1991 E.C.R. at 11-1740.
248 Case T-42/96, Eyckler & Malt AG v. Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. 11-401, 425-26.
249 Case C-49/88, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3187.
250 Id. at 1-3190-91.
251 Id. at 1-3240-41. It stated that the right to a fair hearing must be observed "not only in
the course of proceedings which may result in the imposition of penalties, but also in
investigative proceedings prior to the adoption of anti-dumping regulations which, despite their
general scope, may directly and individually affect the undertakings concerned and entail adverse
consequences for them." Id.
252 Id. at 1-3241.
253 Id. at 1-3243; see also Case C-269/90, Hauptzollamt MOnchen-Mitte v. Technische
UniversitAt Mflnchen, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5495, 5501 (University seeking to import a microscope
from Japan had the right to make views known in a customs duty proceeding, including access
to the documents taken into account by the Community institution).
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that other companies provide in the course of the Commission's investigation.
Balancing the rights of defense against the right of confidentiality is not
easy.2
54
The ECJ noted in Chemiefarma2" that if documents necessary for a
company's defense appeared to divulge business secrets of another company,
then the Commission had to first consult that other company before turning
over those documents.256
Michelin v. Commission repeats the principle that observance of the rights
of defense requires the Commission to enable the target to express its views
effectively on the documents and other evidence used by the Commission to
support its objections and allegations of infringement. On the other hand, once
the Commission decides that information obtained during an investigation is
covered by the principle of non-disclosure of business secrets, it is under a
duty not to disclose that information to the target. As a consequence, the
Commission cannot use that information to support its decision if the refusal
to disclose reduces the target's opportunity to express its views on the
accuracy or scope of the information, or on the conclusions drawn from it by
the Commission. 7
If the Commission discloses information to a target in breach of an
obligation to maintain it in confidence, then it runs the risk of liability for
damages to the person or undertaking that provided the information. This is
shown in Adams v. Commission in which the applicant, Stanley George
Adams, who had once been an employee of Hoffman-LaRoche, disclosed
information to the Commission that eventually led to an investigation and
complaint against the company for abusing its dominant position in the market
for vitamins.258 It was clear in Adams's letter to the Commission that he did
not want his identity revealed, yet edited photocopies of documents the
Commission turned over to Hoffmann-LaRoche enabled the company to
identify Adams as the informant, file a complaint against him, and have him
254 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 40.
255 See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
256 Case 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma NVv. Commn, 1970 E.C.R. 661, 663.
257 Case 322/81, Michelin v. Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3498-99. In this case, the
Commission's statement of reasons did not make express reference to a particular investigation,
nor did it appear that the Commission relied on this particular part of its file by implication. The
Court concluded that the Commission's statement of reasons was sufficient and that no
irregularity in its administrative procedure had been proven. Id. at 3499.
28 Hoffinann-LaRoche is a very important "right to be heard" decision. See supra
notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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arrested and detained upon returning to Switzerland.259 The Court concluded
that the Commission could have done more to protect Adams and to warn him
that documents were being provided to Hoffian-LaRoche.2" It held that the
Community was bound to pay the damages Adams suffered as a result of the
discovery of his identity by means of documents handed over to Hoffman-
LaRoche by the Commission.26'
D. Reasoned Decisions
An agency's duty to state reasons for its action is codified in Article 253 of
the EC Regulations:
Regulations, directives and decisions adopted jointly by the
European Parliament and the Council, and such acts adopted by
the Council or the Commission, shall state the reasons on which
they are based and shall refer to any proposals or opinions which
were required to be obtained pursuant to this Treaty.262
The duty to state reasons is regarded as an essential procedural requirement.
A statement of reasons enables persons affected by a decision to defend their
rights; helps courts supervise the work of agencies; and provides guidance to
citizens, the EU's member states, and others so they can see that the law is
being applied fairly.263 Also, requiring a statement of reasons reinforces the
agency's duty to examine all aspects of the case carefully and impartially.2"
This duty is related to the principle of procedural legal certainty that is
259 Case 145/83, Adams v. Comm'n, 1985 E.C.R. 3539, 3586-88.
260 Id. at 3589-90.
26, Id. at 3592. See generally CRAIG, supra note 19, at 368-69 (discussing difficulties
appling the right of access in complex, multiple party cases).
262 Commission Regulation 297/03, Professional Secrecy in State Aid Decisions, 2003 O.J.
(C 297) 6-9. The European Code of Good Administrative Behavior provides that reason-giving
applies to decisions "which may adversely affect the rights or interests of a private person...."
Also, decisions should not be based on "brief or vague grounds or [grounds] which do not
contain individual reasoning." European Ombudsman, The European Code of Good
Administrative Behavior art. 18 (Jan. 5, 2005) (prepared by P. Nikiforos Diamanours); Mashaw,
supra note 20, at 112.
263 Widdershoven, supra note 64, at 286; Mashaw, supra note 20, at 112-13.
264 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 375.
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observed in the EU. This principle requires that decisions must be clear and
definite and that time limits are observed and enforced.265
The ECJ and the CFI often have discussed the Commission's obligation to
explain its decisions with findings of fact and conclusions of law:266
The Commission is required to state the reasons on which its
decisions are based, enumerating the facts forming the legal basis
of the measure and the considerations which led it to adopt the
decision but it is not required to discuss all the issues of fact and
of law referred to be [sic] every interested party in the course of
the administrative procedure. The statement of reasons for a
decision imposing a fine is to be considered sufficient if it
indicates clearly and coherently the considerations of fact and of
law on the basis of which the fine has been imposed on the
parties concerned, in such a way as to acquaint both the latter and
the Court with the essential factors of the Commission's
reasoning."'
Even though there is some flexibility that turns on the facts and
circumstances of each case with how this requirement is satisfied,268 an
inadequate statement of reasons can lead to the annulment of a decision. For
example, in Suproco NV v. Commission, the CFI annulled a decision because
the lack of detail prevented it from reviewing the decision and also kept the
parties from understanding why their petition for customs relief had been
rejected.269 The CFI stated:
According to settled case-law, the statement of reasons required
by Article 253 EC must be appropriate to the measure at issue
and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the
reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure
265 George A. Bermann et al., Introduction, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, at xx-xxi (2008).
266 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 380-84.
267 Case 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma NV, 1970 E.C.R. 661, 662-63.
268 The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances
of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given
and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct
and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. Case T-101/03, Suproco v.
Comm'n, 2005 ECJ CELEX WESTLAW 603A0101, at *$ 20 (Sept. 22, 2005).
269 Id. 48-49.
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in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to
ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent
Community Court to exercise its power of review. °
The Commission's decision rejecting the petition for customs relief on
imported sugar was annulled because it failed to explain its reasoning for the
rejection. 27 ' This rationale for reasoned decisions is a critical component of
the rights of defense. It parallels the U.S. rationale for this aspect of due
process jurisprudence: to enable affected persons to understand the agency's
decision and to facilitate judicial review.272
The pragmatic approach of the EU courts in determining whether the
reasoned decision requirement has been satisfied is illustrated by the Windpark
Groothusen case that involved a disappointed applicant's request for financial
assistance to support its energy conservation project. 273 The Court responded
with the standard black letter law that the agency's explanation must be
appropriate to the nature of the measure in question and depends on the
circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in
question. In upholding the relatively summary rejection of Windpark's
application, it noted that the number of applicants was high, that all applicants
were aware in advance of the criteria for selecting the various projects, and
that special committees evaluated the applications.274 There was no duty to
provide a detailed statement of reasons to a rejected applicant with
comparative information about the projects that were selected; it was sufficient
to inform the applicant that funding had been exhausted.275
Similarly, in Socigtg Fran~aise des Biscuits Delacre v. Commission, the
Court held that the Commission was not required to explain the details of
setting a subsidy level for butter because the subsidy was adjusted every two
weeks and the dairy industry knew about the process for setting prices.276
The EU's requirement of reasoned decisions, as interpreted pragmatically
by the ECJ and the CFI, matches what U.S. administrative law statutes and
270 Id. *120. See also Case 222/86, UNECTEF v. Heylens, 1987 E.C.R. 4097, 4117.
271 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 23.
272 Mashaw, supra note 20, at 113.
273 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
274 Case C-48/96, Windpark Groothusen GmbH & Co. Betriebs KG v. Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R.
1-2873, 2910.
"7S Id. at 1-2898, 2910.
276 Case C-350/88, 1990 E.C.R. 1-395, 422-23. Similarly, American due process
jurisprudence does not require every detail to be covered, just enough "to show the major issues
of fact and law that were resolved." Mashaw, supra note 20, at 114.
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case law require of decision makers.277 Section 557(c) of the APA provides
that decisions in formal adjudications must be accompanied by "findings and
conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact,
law, or discretion presented on the record... ,278 The EU cases summarized
above do not go as far in specifying the requirements for statement of reasons,
but it is important to recognize that the APA goes well beyond the minimum
required by due process. The Supreme Court stated in Goldberg v. Kelly:
[T]he decisionmaker's conclusion as to a recipient's eligibility
must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the
hearing.... To demonstrate compliance with this elementary
requirement, the decision maker should state the reasons for his
determination and indicate the evidence he relied on, though his
statement need not amount to a full opinion or even formal
findings of fact and conclusions of law.279
Goldberg v. Kelly is regarded as the high water mark of our procedural due
process jurisprudence, illustrating that decisions can be quite informal and still
pass due process muster. For instance, section 555(e) of the APA applies to
informal adjudication and specifies:
Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of
a written application, petition, or other request of an interested
person made in connection with any agency proceeding. Except
in affirming a prior denial or when the denial is self-explanatory,
the notice shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the
grounds for denial.28
This requirement is easily satisfied. One court held that even a general
statement that addresses only some of a petitioner's arguments is sufficient,2"'
while another court stated that a person whose request for a waiver had been
277 Mashaw, supra note 20, at 113-16.
278 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (2006).
279 397 U.S. 254,271 (1970) (citations omitted). American courts have sometimes required
agencies to explain inconsistent determinations. See, e.g., United Auto Workers v. NLRB, 802
F.2d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 1986).
280 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2006).
281 Estate of L.D. French v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 603 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th
Cir. 1979).
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denied was entitled to sufficient detail to permit a court to review the agency's
decision.282
The modest requirements of section 555(e) are reinforced by the Supreme
Court's leading decision on informal adjudication, Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe.283 This decision has the effect of requiring courts
reviewing informal agency action to take a hard look at the agency's record to
determine whether there was compliance with the governing statutes and
whether proper procedures were followed. The prospect of this hard look
review compels agencies to explain their decisions adequately in order to show
that they have not abused discretion or violated any mandatory procedures.284
This explanation is not an onerous burden; a brief letter might be sufficient.285
It is plausible to argue that Overton Park only requires an agency to give
the reviewing court a record that is adequate forjudicial review. The decision
does not mandate a specific form or content for the decision reached in an
informal adjudication.286 The ECJ's and the CFI's decisions that discuss the
importance of reasoned decisions and explanations seem to go beyond what is
required by section 555(e) of the APA and the Supreme Court's decision in
Overton Park by emphasizing the affected party's interest in having an
adequate explanation for the outcome as much as the reviewing court's need
for a reasoned decision. In practice, however, the differences may be more
semantic than real. Both promote "the monitoring activities of both political
and legal institutions," through which "the fundamental value of reason giving
is political and legal accountability.""2 7 Moreover, by codifying a duty to state
reasons in the EC Regulations, the EU has arguably made reason-giving a
fundamental aspect of good administration that is not simply a component of
hearing rights and to facilitate review. Perhaps reason-giving can be seen as
a fundamental aspect of democratic governance, a check against arbitrary and
capricious governmental action.288
282 Gillette v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 737 F.2d 883, 886-87 (10th Cir. 1984).
283 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
284 Fox, supra note 1, at 300, 302.
285 Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973).
286 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654-56 (1990); Fox, supra
note 1, at 249.
287 Mashaw, supra note 20, at 115; Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Relationship
Between Fundamental Values and Procedural Safeguards in Constitutional Right to Hearing
Cases, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 301, 302-04 (1979).
288 Mashaw, supra note 20, at 118-24.
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V. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS: Do THE EU RIGHTS OF DEFENSE
AFFORD DUE PROCESS?
It is reasonable to conclude, after reading many decisions of the ECJ and
CFI, as well as considerable scholarly commentary, that the rights of defense
have evolved into a robust set of procedural requirements that protect the
interests of parties involved in adjudications before the Commission and EU
agencies. Notwithstanding the lack of procedural uniformity from sector to
sector and from agency to agency, this well-developed and still evolving
bundle of procedures satisfies the requirements of procedural due process as
it is appreciated and understood in the United States. Persons and
undertakings in the EU are entitled to notice that informs them of an agency's
objections or concerns; they enjoy a right of access to the agency's file; they
are entitled to respond to the agency's objections and present their side of the
matter; and they have a right to a reasoned decision. These rights are bolstered
by the ECJ's and CFI's recognition of general principles of good
administration"' and the administrative agency's duty of care or diligence, that
is, the duty to examine all aspects of a case carefully and impartially.29 °
Moreover, the ECJ and the CFI have been willing to annul agency decisions
when the administration failed to afford a party adequate procedural
safeguards.
The most substantial differences between EU and U.S. procedural
safeguards involve "hearings." The right to respond to a EU agency's
concerns or objections does not necessarily involve an oral proceeding. Even
when there is an oral hearing, the give and take between the agency, the
parties, and persons appearing at the proceeding does not necessarily involve
the kind of direct examination and cross-examination associated with "formal"
agency adjudications in the United States under the APA.291 Hearings in the
EU are rarely adversarial. As discussed earlier in this Article, the varied
approach to how hearings are conducted under EU administrative law reflects
the marriage of civil law and common law traditions.2 92 The EU's varied
approach to the hearing component of the rights of defense does not, however,
undermine this Article's central thesis that the bundle of procedural safeguards
289 See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text; CRAIG, supra note 19, at 374-75;
Wakefield, supra note 28, at 64-65.
291 See Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 19, at 12-13 nn.24-25 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
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protecting parties before the EU Commission and EU agencies satisfies the
U.S. conception of procedural due process.
The established three-part test for assessing the process due to a person in
the U.S. was announced in Matthews v. Eldridge:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.293
It is important to remember that the Supreme Court, in applying this test to
a person who claimed rights to a personal appearance and oral argument prior
to the termination of disability benefits, ultimately concluded that those
procedural safeguards were unnecessary because the underlying medical
question depended on "routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by
physician specialists." '294 The Mathews v. Eldridge opinion also made clear
that trial-type procedures are not the only means for reaching sound decisions
in adjudications. "The judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a
required, nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all
circumstances." '295 In short, the test from Mathews v. Eldridge, quoted above,
does not mandate an adversarial, trial-type hearing in all agency adjudications,
nor does it impose all the other procedural safeguards associated in the United
States with trial-type, adversarial hearings.296 The Supreme Court has backed
293 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
294 Id. at 344. The standardized and impartial nature of the documents gave them probative
value so that an oral evidentiary hearing was not needed. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 97,
at 181. See also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971).
295 424 U.S. at 348. The Court also said that in assessing the adequacy of a challenged
decision making process "substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the
individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that the
procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals."
Id. at 349.
296 See, e.g., Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1978)
(adversarial process inappropriate to questions of academic performance); Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (live medical testimony is not constitutionally mandated at
disability claim hearings); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-82 (1975) (adjudicatory model
inappropriate in the context ofhigh school suspensions and discipline); AMAN&MAYTON, supra
note 97, at 173.
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away steadily from the adversarial model that it endorsed in Goldberg v.
Kelly.297 The trial-type proceeding is no longer regarded as the standard
requirement.298
Although the range of procedural safeguards varies with the nature of the
decision and the interest at stake in both the United States and the EU,299 the
essential elements in both procedural systems are notice reasonably calculated
to appraise interested parties of the agency action that affords them an
opportunity to present their objections to the administrative agency's
position,3°° disclosure of the agency's reasons for its proposed action,"0 an
opportunity for interested parties to present their side of the matter as well as
facts and reasons to refute the agency's position,"a2 an unbiased decision
maker.0 3 These key elements are required by the many procedural due process
decisions in the United States, and they are mandated as well by the decisions
of the ECJ and the CFI on the rights of defense.
These procedural safeguards in the United States and in the EU are
essential for protecting and maintaining the rule of law.3" They ensure that
agency officials follow known procedures and comply with known legal
standards in reaching decisions. These safeguards thereby prevent arbitrary
and abusive exercises of governmental power. They ensure that persons
subject to governmental action as well as the agency itself will have
information that is essential to a fair and accurate decision. They provide the
parties an opportunity to inform the administrative agency's decision makers
about the facts and how the law should be applied to those facts. They
constrain factual determinations and ensure fair application of the law to the
297 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970).
298 Rabin, supra note 287, at 306. "Some argue that our system's obsession with permitting
the adversarial airing of grievances has created a monster." See also STEPHEN YEAZELL, CiVIL
PROCEDURE 2 (7th ed. 2008).
299 CRAIG, supra note 19, at 349, 360-63; AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 97, at 151, 170.
" Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Case 17/74
Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 1063.
301 See Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1987); Joined
Cases 100-103/80, SA Musique Diffusion Frangaise v. Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R. 1825.
302 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); Case C-1 35/92, Fiskano
AB v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2885.
303 AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 97, at 173-74; CRAIG, supra note 19, at 370-72.
31 Wakefield, supra note 28, at 21. See CRAIG, supra note 19, at 360-61 (noting that the
process rights "render it more likely that a correct outcome will be reached on the substance of
a case" and recognized "what it means to treat a person as a human being"); AMAN & MAYTON,
supra note 97, at 170-71 (discussing the fairness and accuracy of decisions that are reached
through procedures that abide by due process requirements).
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facts presented at the proceedings." 5 These procedural safeguards ensure fair
and accurate decisions on the merits for the benefit of the administration as
well as the individual.30 6
Moreover, values that are fundamental to the U.S. conception of procedural
due process are also fundamental to the EU's rights of defense. Both
approaches protect individuals from arbitrary and capricious exercises of
administrative authority. They share an interest in having agencies reach
rational results in individualized cases for the benefit of the parties and also the
administrative agency. To achieve a rational result, some kind of fact-finding
process is needed as well as a decision maker who applies the appropriate legal
standard to those facts. Both approaches share an interest in accountability so
that an impartial, outside observer can look at decisions and determine that the
agency's action is rational and consistent with its mandate. Finally, both
approaches assure that the decision is explained adequately for the benefit of
the individual affected by the agency determination and serve the goals of
rationality and accountability.0 7
There are, of course, circumstances where most of the safeguards
associated with an adversarial hearing are needed. This is recognized in the
EU as well as in the United States. 3"8 However, both approaches recognize
that the fundamental values we associate with procedural due process and the
rights of defense can be protected without adopting the adversarial model.30 9
The rights of defense that have evolved in the EU and procedural due
process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments share common values and
goals. Notwithstanding the differences between adjudicative proceedings
before administrative agencies in the United States and the EU, there is
convergence, and the respective doctrines are functionally equivalent.
305 Shapiro & Levy, supra note 98, at 111-13 (discussing the rule of law functions served by
procedural due process requirements); AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 97, at 170-72.
306 Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) (legal process
minimizes the risk of erroneous decisions); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,579 (1975) (the student
has an interest in avoiding an erroneous suspension); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484
(1972) (society has an interest in not having parole revoked erroneously).
307 Cf Rabin, supra note 287, at 302-04.
308 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970); AslMow & DUNLOP, supra
note 19, at 25-27 (discussing the elaborate procedures followed before the Commission in
competition sector).
39 See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (discussing the inquisitorial or investigative
model associated with continental administrative law decision making); Rabin, supra note 287,
at 310-11 (explaining how a notice-and-comment proceeding before an independent hearing
examiner who is required to provide the claimant with a documented statement of reasons for
the decision safeguards the values of due process).
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